( February 2o12 )
Keynes was right
and he was an optimist when it comes to politicians' willingness
to pay back debt...
This essay
is intended to be a playful way to describe the positive impact of a directorial executive.
We start with the basic rules of the board game Monopoly. Imagine additionally
the bank of the game as a fusion of a government with the banking industry.
The American Dream
In America's Monopoly, the bank is the vault for the cash.
If you're out of money, you've lost.
The game stops when only one player is left.
The European Welfare State
In Europe's Monopoly, the bank is also the welfare state.
If you're out of money, you can submit a request to the bank for more free money.
The game goes on, the rich get richer, the poor stay poor, until the bank is broke.
The Welfare Dream
If too many players risk to go broke, the bank hands out money to everyone.
The rich receive as well and more than the poor players.
The game goes on - until it collapses and one player is left with all the money from the game.
The Helvetic Monopoly
The bank is directed by a council.
If you're out of money, you either deserve to be kicked out of the game,
or you might have been just rather unlucky and deserve a second chance.
Over-the-thumb rule : free money - but not enough for a round - plus a loan from the rich.
If you're then lucky, you can start a living again and pay back the loan.
If you're less lucky, unlike the bank the rich can show solidarity
and cancel part or all of your debt.
The game goes on - until everybody is bored...
In Monopoly,
The rich need the cash flow of the poor to win.
The poor need a backup to protect from misfortune.
The bank needs the rich's solidarity in tough times.
In theory,
the survivability of the Helvetic Monopoly,
is that the incentives in the council
enable it to poker out the rich's solidarity in good times.
Something that seems in the other variations only difficultly possible
or at least only too irregularly happening.
The actors strife also for individual prosperity,
the difference is that the bank is in the hands of each layer of players.
And with three members at least, there will always be a middle-actor
who's future lies in either the richer or the poorer layer,
depending mostly on luck or misfortune.
The middle-actor has therefore a marginally bigger incentive to work out a compromise.
Once a compromise is on the table,
the other two layers have a marginally bigger incentive to vote for that compromise,
especially in good times,
where it doesn't cost the rich,
and nevertheless reassures the poor.
A dynamic and fair set of rules can emerge,
punishing rather individual recklessness than misfortune
and protecting rather from the latter than the first,
all while rewarding innovation and the benefits of assiduity,
rather than pure luck.
In reality,
the priority for government is not social justice or individual freedom,
it's the protection of property, rights and obligations,
the guarantee of the rule of law and of legal justice.
Welfare, education, healthcare, science, infrastructure, utilities and all the other markets
are only the forums where the executive can balance
- through regulations -
the social justice
by cutting or adding
certain individual freedoms.
The difference
with the division of the directorial executive
is the creation of an incentive for the centrist
to poker out compromises for the middle-class.
The result
of a constitution that such favors the moderate is a fair and dynamic society
where the hope of solving the interest conflicts at the table defuses the fear
of having them ignored by the rich respectively ignited by the poor.