Modern governments are not just holding the monopoly of force anymore protecting with it the people and the rule of law, no, they're today in the nation's interest also public investment funds that have the goal to redistribute the country's wealth and to promote the economy by acting in the healthcare, education, infrastructure or energy sectors amongst many others. The state acts as buyer, seller or market maker and often has even a commercial monopoly.
And no, that's not enough, the presidents and prime ministers on today's globe control also a substantial part of the democratic decision making process, from initiating the new laws and reforms over promoting them to finally working out the details and deadlines.
You could mind your government to be so powerful. Yet it's a good way to defend your freedom, rights and assets against the aleas of nature, organized crime, radicalism or Wall Street. Just how can you now prevent that strong government from becoming a liability itself?
And no, that's not enough, the presidents and prime ministers on today's globe control also a substantial part of the democratic decision making process, from initiating the new laws and reforms over promoting them to finally working out the details and deadlines.
You could mind your government to be so powerful. Yet it's a good way to defend your freedom, rights and assets against the aleas of nature, organized crime, radicalism or Wall Street. Just how can you now prevent that strong government from becoming a liability itself?
Modern citizens have not much choice but to assume that the government is acting in the country's interest - until proven otherwise. They have learned that nor the courts nor the parliaments are strong enough to discover corruption anyway - at least not in time. The citizens' acceptance of such an "executive presumption of innocence" gives government the flexibility needed to handle modern state matters and to guarantee the rule of law - and it opens up the possibility for inequality, corruption and a lot of other reasons to go to the streets.
True democracy starts at the beginning. In order to prevent abuse of public funds and to guarantee the safe use of state authority, the truth about decisions can never be in control of just one hand. Government action has to be always a social compromise and can never be subject to the will of just one person. The people are better off if the central administration is led by several and not one person. A divided highest public office is a condition sine qua non for a population to accept a constitution. That's at least the spirit of a directorial democracy.
In order for your executive to be effective, the central administration needs to be able to act as one, assuming you want a head-of-state that is believed to be strong enough to act in the national interest. If at the same time you want to prevent your government from becoming a liability for a merry society, then the head-of-state's powers need to be divided inside itself.
And so the constitution's first check-and-balance must be in the executive already.
True democracy starts at the beginning. In order to prevent abuse of public funds and to guarantee the safe use of state authority, the truth about decisions can never be in control of just one hand. Government action has to be always a social compromise and can never be subject to the will of just one person. The people are better off if the central administration is led by several and not one person. A divided highest public office is a condition sine qua non for a population to accept a constitution. That's at least the spirit of a directorial democracy.
In order for your executive to be effective, the central administration needs to be able to act as one, assuming you want a head-of-state that is believed to be strong enough to act in the national interest. If at the same time you want to prevent your government from becoming a liability for a merry society, then the head-of-state's powers need to be divided inside itself.
And so the constitution's first check-and-balance must be in the executive already.
Critical questions must be given a table in the country where they can be asked without threatening nor the speed nor the monopoly of central power. You want your highest public office to be a council ; you want a head-of-state who's important decisions are taken democratically at a round table by several equal ministers, or is that too bewildering ?
If Napoleon would have sticked to the principle of shared decision making, his military empire wouldn't have collapsed and we'd all be French now. That's the effect in a nutshell, and it's more complex of course.
What's the nation's economic, social and religious background? What's the role of parliament, the judicial branch and maybe the monarchy? Is it a federal or a centrist state and do the people have the right to veto legislation? It all effects the role and strength of the executive, and whether the different members of the collegial government can work together and guarantee a functioning highest public office.
The central administration's corporate culture is driven by the ruling party's paradigm in presidential democracies. In the daily decision making process of the executive, the opposition's morals might be missing for a decade or more. And if in a western-style democracy a minority party succeeds to be part of a coalition government, it always only receives executive authority under the umbrella of one of the majority-basing parties - diluting thereby its political freedom and independence.
Therefore a community or social movement representing between ten and twenty percent of the population will always rather lose than be treated fairly in western democracies. Presidents and prime ministers enjoy the full constitutional trust of the whole population, even if elected by only a close majority. Parliaments can start impeachment procedures in order to balance the power of modern executives, but it's either a slow process and a democratic minefield that is avoided, or it's a rapid process with little effect on the underlying causes of the initial distrust towards the executive.
In the western democracy model, this factor causes the governing ideology to be over-represented in the highest public office, allowing in turn the presidents and prime ministers to enjoy an "overhanging trust", deducted from the image of a cliff that is overhanging, that is with a base smaller than its top.
And while this overhanging trust the presidents enjoy doesn't cause the government to be directly a liability for a society, it doesn't help preventing it from becoming one neither. The president's ideology influences government action and modern governments are power social institutions. Whether to be represented in parliament or as well in the executive makes for a community a substantial difference in every day life - certainly over time. And so it seems fair for a social group - even if it's only a minority - to ask for a share in the presidential decision making - at least from time to time.
The main effect of the directorial leadership is an inability of overhanging trust to build up. It ensures continuous administrative innovation isn't blocked. Party politics find a table that is neutral and so the balance of power tips towards the diversity of the nation. The underlying balance comes from a different election behavior of the electorate. In a stable environment, a council is barely challenged by new political movements and can implement and finish long term policy changes. The general satisfaction of the population and the already heterogeneous executive make it impossible for new movements to find a majority in parliament for a chair in the federal council.
But in critical times, and thanks to the intrinsic division of government and the resulting lowered entry level, the ruling packs behind the federal chairs feel early enough that their otherwise unshakable positions are trembling. Political inertia that would threaten public funds is canceled through the ease of access to government. The more leaders tend to ignore the will of the nation, the easier it becomes for the population to take back government in subsequent elections and power trading.
The main parties are either able to adapt to ever changing realities of the population, or they risk losing one chair after another. Swiss experience shows a chair is gone for decades once lost. The population doesn't seem to forgive political inertia so rapidly.
On one side we seem to have the presidential or prime ministerial systems where a ruling party can ignore fifteen percent of the population in good times, and where it can ignore them as well in rough times. The winner-takes-all mentality of western democracies means for a citizen that voting for a minority party only weakens the own political wing, means it's counterproductive for the electorate to support a new movement.
On the other side we seem to have the directorial system with a council composed of several equal ministers, where with fifteen percent of the votes a new movement can claim one of seven councilor chairs. Not a majority, yet still a part in the executive decision making process. It would allow them at least to shape the highest public office's morals and with it the corporate culture of the central administration - certainly over time.
A constitution with a directorial executive therefore rather attunes the use of public forces and assets to the needs of the common people.
A council as the highest public office prevents the political establishment of lavishly ruining the social peace, the wealth and freedom that a nation had built up over time. And while last year the West's elite was desperately trying to re-gain the population's trust through "leadership", unity-governments and super-committees, the Swiss Federal Council got relatively silently re-elected.
In theory, presidential democracies are subject to a constant over-representation of the most powerful political ideology. Over the course of time and together with the resulting constant lack of independent presence of minority-thinking, overhanging trust will always develop to an indefeasible opportunity for the political elite to ignore a substantial part of the population and start appropriating state assets or handing out administrative favors. Otherwise said, the political arena that should display pure democratic power trading will probably always turn into a hopeless king's court.
And while in practice and gladly the negative effects of this overhanging trust are made up regularly by economic growth or charismatic leaders, it still seems rather questionable to give full executive powers into the hands of one man or one woman, unintentionally or intentionally intertwining thereby the fate of a whole nation intrinsically to the soul of one person.
What's the nation's economic, social and religious background? What's the role of parliament, the judicial branch and maybe the monarchy? Is it a federal or a centrist state and do the people have the right to veto legislation? It all effects the role and strength of the executive, and whether the different members of the collegial government can work together and guarantee a functioning highest public office.
The central administration's corporate culture is driven by the ruling party's paradigm in presidential democracies. In the daily decision making process of the executive, the opposition's morals might be missing for a decade or more. And if in a western-style democracy a minority party succeeds to be part of a coalition government, it always only receives executive authority under the umbrella of one of the majority-basing parties - diluting thereby its political freedom and independence.
Therefore a community or social movement representing between ten and twenty percent of the population will always rather lose than be treated fairly in western democracies. Presidents and prime ministers enjoy the full constitutional trust of the whole population, even if elected by only a close majority. Parliaments can start impeachment procedures in order to balance the power of modern executives, but it's either a slow process and a democratic minefield that is avoided, or it's a rapid process with little effect on the underlying causes of the initial distrust towards the executive.
In the western democracy model, this factor causes the governing ideology to be over-represented in the highest public office, allowing in turn the presidents and prime ministers to enjoy an "overhanging trust", deducted from the image of a cliff that is overhanging, that is with a base smaller than its top.
And while this overhanging trust the presidents enjoy doesn't cause the government to be directly a liability for a society, it doesn't help preventing it from becoming one neither. The president's ideology influences government action and modern governments are power social institutions. Whether to be represented in parliament or as well in the executive makes for a community a substantial difference in every day life - certainly over time. And so it seems fair for a social group - even if it's only a minority - to ask for a share in the presidential decision making - at least from time to time.
The main effect of the directorial leadership is an inability of overhanging trust to build up. It ensures continuous administrative innovation isn't blocked. Party politics find a table that is neutral and so the balance of power tips towards the diversity of the nation. The underlying balance comes from a different election behavior of the electorate. In a stable environment, a council is barely challenged by new political movements and can implement and finish long term policy changes. The general satisfaction of the population and the already heterogeneous executive make it impossible for new movements to find a majority in parliament for a chair in the federal council.
But in critical times, and thanks to the intrinsic division of government and the resulting lowered entry level, the ruling packs behind the federal chairs feel early enough that their otherwise unshakable positions are trembling. Political inertia that would threaten public funds is canceled through the ease of access to government. The more leaders tend to ignore the will of the nation, the easier it becomes for the population to take back government in subsequent elections and power trading.
The main parties are either able to adapt to ever changing realities of the population, or they risk losing one chair after another. Swiss experience shows a chair is gone for decades once lost. The population doesn't seem to forgive political inertia so rapidly.
On one side we seem to have the presidential or prime ministerial systems where a ruling party can ignore fifteen percent of the population in good times, and where it can ignore them as well in rough times. The winner-takes-all mentality of western democracies means for a citizen that voting for a minority party only weakens the own political wing, means it's counterproductive for the electorate to support a new movement.
On the other side we seem to have the directorial system with a council composed of several equal ministers, where with fifteen percent of the votes a new movement can claim one of seven councilor chairs. Not a majority, yet still a part in the executive decision making process. It would allow them at least to shape the highest public office's morals and with it the corporate culture of the central administration - certainly over time.
A constitution with a directorial executive therefore rather attunes the use of public forces and assets to the needs of the common people.
A council as the highest public office prevents the political establishment of lavishly ruining the social peace, the wealth and freedom that a nation had built up over time. And while last year the West's elite was desperately trying to re-gain the population's trust through "leadership", unity-governments and super-committees, the Swiss Federal Council got relatively silently re-elected.
In theory, presidential democracies are subject to a constant over-representation of the most powerful political ideology. Over the course of time and together with the resulting constant lack of independent presence of minority-thinking, overhanging trust will always develop to an indefeasible opportunity for the political elite to ignore a substantial part of the population and start appropriating state assets or handing out administrative favors. Otherwise said, the political arena that should display pure democratic power trading will probably always turn into a hopeless king's court.
And while in practice and gladly the negative effects of this overhanging trust are made up regularly by economic growth or charismatic leaders, it still seems rather questionable to give full executive powers into the hands of one man or one woman, unintentionally or intentionally intertwining thereby the fate of a whole nation intrinsically to the soul of one person.
Are you crazy? Not even the citizens from the old Roman Republic had such a negligent risk attitude. They had at least two consuls. Don't you think the yang is missing in the yin-yang of your constitution? Wise government is not promoted in a system with one leader. The odds are always against you. The Egyptians got rid of their dictator just to stand in front of an army leadership they couldn't tell whether it was acting in their own or in the national interest. Fifty-one percent of the Americans aren't sure whether they should blame Ralph Nader or the system for President Bush Jr and everything that followed. It's the system, stupid! The directorial executive style divides the highest executive institution not for freedom, but for peace in which freedom can grow. Today, the Swiss Confederation is a rock with a flourishing society on it.